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South Africa became television's final frontier in the industrialized world. The country first 
glimpsed TV at Johannesburg's Empire Exhibition in 1936 - the very year the medium was 
launched in Britain and just four years after its experimental introduction in the USA. [l]  Yet 
there would be a lag of four decades between that first Johannesburg sighting and the 
inauguration of a South African television service. By 1949, the Broadcast Amendment Act 
had already placed the introduction of TV under the aegis of the South African Broadcasting 
Corporation. But such was the National Party's resistance to the medium that this remained 
an interminably abstract responsibility - by the time South African TV finally went on the air 
in 1976, over 130 nations could boast a prior service. 
The South African ban on TV ranks as the most drastic act of cultural protectionism in the 
history of the medium. It stands, moreover, as the most extensive act of pre-emptive 
censorship by a regime notorious for curbing free speech. The ban went well beyond the 
familiar measures of removing from circulation - in advance of their issuance - an individual 
writer's books, a politician's words, or an organization's publications. For in the process of 
barring television from South Africa the ruling National Party anathematized an entire 
technology. 
Dr Albert Hertzog, the cabinet minister responsible for media affairs, convicted the telly in 
its absence of being nothing more than "spiritual dagga" (ganga), while another vocal 
opponent dismissed it as a "school for crime". [2] On several occasions, in parliament and in 
the press, Nationalists trundled out the warning of a German sage that "while the atom bomb 
kills the body, television destroys the soul". [3] Hertzog fulminated against "that evil black 
box; sickly, mawkish, sentimentalistic, and leading to dangerous liberalistic tendencies". [4] 
And, in one of his more lurid denunciations, he explained to parliament that "inside the pill 
[of TV] there is the bitter poison which will ultimately mean the downfall of civilizations". 
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What enabled TV to incarnate, by the late 1950s and the 1960s, menace of such proportions? 
Afrikaner nationalists were, of course, not alone in implicating TV in the spread of moral 
turpitude. But their assaults should be distinguished from the protestations of, say, Mary 
Whitehouse in Britain and Phyllis Shaffley in the USA. For, almost without exception, 
international critiques of TV's putative debasement of national morality only gathered force 
after the technology's inception. Television was ordinarily admitted as soon as it was deemed 
affordable. While the degree of government control varied considerably from one society to 
the next, the medium was by and large accepted as one more modern convenience; there was 
no long hiatus of suspicion separating invention from implementation. Only after its 
introduction did the controversies sizzle over TV's impact on everything from family 
dynamics and ethnic identity to sleeping habits and living-room decor. Under apartheid, this 
scenario was played in reverse: a quarter of a century before the monster showed its face, the 
society was inundated with advance warnings about the social chaos it would unleash. 
The prominence of rationalized fantasy in pre-emptive censorship makes it particularly 
suggestive material for an analysis of nationalism. Censorship, like nationalism, seeks to 
articulate group identity around a set of exclusions. To narrate and depict who we are 
inevitably entails narratives and depictions of who it is that we are not. In other words, 
censorship and nationalism intersect in so far as they both set the parameters of community 
by dividing the admissable from the inadmissable, the values, products, and people who 
belong from those deemed unassirnilable and alien. Afrikaner nationalists' protracted, 
impassioned, and detailed justifications of the ban on TV thus give unusual focus to their 
intellectual and administrative efforts to reorganize relations between ethnicity, race, cultural 
identity, national and international community. Moreover, given the indelible imprint of 
America on the very idea of TV, Afrikaner nationalists' arguments against the technology 
disclose an uneasy relation to American culture - or at least to those spectres of American 
culture that haunted their imaginings. Thus, over the course of the TV controversy, the civil 
rights movement, the Cold War, cowboy films, and the Apollo space mission were all 
refracted through the anxieties and ambitions of Afrikaner nationalism. 
From a theoretical standpoint, the issues raised by the enforced absence of TV under 
apartheid impinge on many of the focal debates in contemporary cultural studies. They 
assume, for instance, direct relevance to controversies over cultural imperialism in the media 
as well as to current inquiry into the inventions of ethnicity, race, and nationhood and 
relations among these constructs. Because Afrikaner nationalists argued against admitting 
TV not only into the nation state but into the home as, by implication, a national analogue, 
their contentions also give focus to current inquiry into the institutionalized, gendered 
partitioning of public from private space. Finally, the debates emphasize TV's double-edged 
relation to modernity; forces opposed to the medium presented it as a catalyst of 
degeneration, while proponents billed it as an agent of progress. Overall, the ferocity and 
extremity of the South African debates trouble some of the more reductive theoretical 
assumptions about relations among contradictory formulations of cultural difference. 
The most arresting of these disturbances occurs around the discourse of cultural imperialism. 
For the past few decades, the idea of cultural imperialism has been securely wedded to four 
assumptions: that such imperialism is principally of American provenance; that its main 
conduits are the moving images of American TV and Hollywood; that the language of 
cultural imperialism is an inherently left discourse; and that the appropriate unit of analysis is 
the nation-state, cultural imperialism arising when the insitutions, products, and values of a 
powerful nation-state threaten those of a weaker one. 
The history of TV's absence under apartheid bears out the first two of these presuppositions: 
the USA, especially American TV, was indeed cast as the dominant source of cultural 
imperialism. However, the remaining two assumptions are thrown into disarray. In South 
Africa, the anti-imperialist cry against le defi americain ,which has typically emanated from 
within a Marxist-socialist spectrum ranging from Herbert Schiller and Fidel Castro to Jack 
Laing and Aiiel Dorfman, was wielded forcefully by the far right. The South African case 
disturbs the assumption behind most such cultural imperialist theory that national culture and 
the nation-state are coterminous. This shortcoming is a consequence of the history of this 
strain of theory. [6] During the 1960s and 1970s, the formative era.for such analyses, the 
anti-capitalism of cultural imperialist thought was coupled to a more romantic view of the 
progressive potential and internal coherence of "Third World" nation-states than now seems 
possible. This limitation was sharpened by the emergence of cultural imperialist theories 
principally out of studies on the impact exerted by US culture on Latin American nation- 
states. Most of such states exhibit greater religious, ethnic, and linguistic cohesion than 
almost all their African and many of their Asian equivalents. 
The assumed sanctity of the nation-state as the legitimate unit of cultural self-regulation 
cannot account for circumstances where people give greater weight to the invented 
international "kinships" of religion (Catholicism, say, or Islam) or of cross-border ethnicity 
(Kurds, Somalis, Armenians) over the invented "kinships" of nation-state nationalism. 
Neither can it account for the contest among cultures within the nation-state - a point of 
fundamental relevance to TV's exclusion from South Africa. For an inquiry into right-wing 
nationalist invocations of cultural imperialist discourse highlights the difficulty of 
accounting, within that paradigm, for circumstances where an ethnic micronationalism seizes 
state power and invokes the principle of national cultural sovereignty against the putative 
predations of a foreign culture. To reduce this scenario, in the South African instance, to a 
clash between a muscular American imperialism and a weaker Afiikaner nationalism is to 
ignore the complex relations between international and intranational discrepancies in cultural 
power. 
Left- and right-wing critiques of TV imperialism - like those of Schiller on one ideological 
flank, J A Marais on the other - share some significant common ground. [7] That much is 
suggested, for instance, by Schiller's assertion that "Television as it operates today is a 
mortal enemy of national identity. As a market-driven industry, TV practically guarantees the 
destruction of national identity." [g] Both Schiller and Marais give priority to the nation as a 
unit of cultural belonging and, moreover, present national culture as an absolute condition. It 
either exists or it is under threat. There is no accomodation of the possibility that, as Stuart 
Hall has suggested, culture may simultaneously become more global and more local through 
what he calls a "double-helical movement". [9] That is, neither the left- nor the right-wing 
critic acknowledges that the internationalizing of culture may produce not simple 
homogenization but new melds that can express a national, ethnic, or national sense of 
cultural belonging in process. Finally, both Schiller and Marais repudiate American TV on 
grounds of anti-imperialism in tandem with anti-capitalism. Thus, from either end of the 
political spectrum, they represent monopoly capital and TV as collaborative catalysts for the 
dissolution of national and/or ethnic bonds, the result being simultaneous economic 
integration and cultural homogenization. 
However, Marais and his anti-TV allies pressed this hostility toward internationalism and 
cosmopolitanism much further. For, besides projecting monopoly capitalism and TV as 
corrosive, denationalizing forces, they levelled a related critique against communism and 
liberalism as well. Indeed, among the most vocal Afrikaner nationalist opponents of the 
medium, it became an article of faith that TV, like monopoly capitalism, communism, and 
liberalism, promotes sameness. Television thus came to be cast as an emissary of a Janus- 
faced Soviet-American challenge to the integrity of Afrikaner nationalism. Any investigation 
into the TV ban entails an examination of the political circumstances that enabled the 
technology to feature as such a versatile bearer of ideological subversion. 
It was Dr Piet Meyer who came to voice, in its most paranoid form, the nationalist fear of a 
hydra-headed internationalism. During the era when the TV imbroglio reached its apogee, the 
intransigent Meyer wielded considerable institutional clout: from 1959 to 1981 he was head 
of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) and, from 1960 to 1972, chaired the 
Broederbond, the clandestine, neo-Masonic "band of brothers" who exercised substantial 
influence over apartheid policy, notably during the eras of Verwoerd and Vorster's 
premierships. In 1959, the year of his appointment as chair of the SABC board of directors, 
Meyer published a book on the evolution and destiny of Afrikaner nationalism in which he 
depicted a veritable Niagara of international forces that threatened to inundate Afiikanerdom: 
"During this period the Afrikaner has been busy ... taking a stand against Russian and 
Chinese communism, India imperialism, Eastern, Middle Eastern and North African 
Mohammedanism, West European liberalism, American capitalistic sentimentalism and 
fervent anti-white Bantu animism in Africa." [l01 
This sense of well-nigh universal engulfment should not, however, leave the impression that 
anti-imperialist objections to TV were articulated only in the name of safeguarding Afiikaner 
nationalism. The group identities being shielded from TV's corrosive influence shifted 
substantially from one formulation to the next: these included the Afrikaner nation, the white 
nation, the white race, the Bantu nation, a constellation of ethnic groups advancing toward 
self-governing nationhood, Western civilization, Christian Western civilization, and the 
family. Such varied invocations disclose the contradictions within the rhetorical repertoire of 
a racist nationalism, for animosity toward TV was voiced through the political registers of 
ethnic nationalist solidarity, of national racial solidarity, and of multiculturalism, the latter 
producing what one might call the racism of cultural respect - that is, racism without 
enunciated races. [l11 Finally, in the most contradictory of these formulations, Meyer, 
Hertzog and others opposed to TV utilized what Wilhelm Reich has termed "national 
internationalism", a process whereby an ultra nationalism ordinarily hostile to 
internationalism designates itself as a defender of an imagined transnational community -- in 
this case, the white race or Christian Western Civilization. [l21 However, one overarching 
anxiety binds most of the arguments against TV: the fear of what the medium's adversaries 
called "denationalization" on the one hand, "integration" on the other. Thus, to examine the 
sundry defences of the ban is to chart the slippage between efforts to circumscribe 
community imaginatively in ethnic, racial, national, and international terms. 
As the Nationalists were at pains to point out, the setting up of TV is far more costly than 
radio or newspaper initiatives. It has therefore tended - particularly pre-cable - to generate 
more heavily centralized services than other media. The steep costs of production also makes 
national television more reliant on foreign, particularly American programming. In 
combination, these tendencies were used to vindicate Nationalist claims that the very nature 
of the technology promoted an American ideology of melting-pot assimilation and would 
erode political programmes that sought to differentiate between groups, whether along 
Afrikaans-English lines, black-white divides or (particularly after the Promotion of Bantu 
Self-Government Bill of 1959) along a variety of state-promoted, ethnic, nationalist fractures. 
In short, the National Party portrayed television as an agent of cultural fusion subversive of 
state efforts to promote cultural fission. 
The depiction of TV as an imperial catalyst of national dissolution, cultural fusion, and racial 
integration served as the central objection to the medium, but it was supported by subsidiary 
claims. South Africa had too many mountains to make it suitable TV terrain. But hadn't 
Switzerland and Peru found a route around that problem? South Africa had too many 
languages. Weren't Ethiopia and Ghana, both of which admitted TV before South Africa, 
linguistically more diverse? The country was too large and sparsely inhabited. What of other, 
more thinly populated nations - Canada, the Sudan, Australia, Mongolia? As early as 1953 
the National Party claimed to be adopting a wait-and-see policy, arguing that, given the 
inevitability of technological progress, too hasty an adoption of TV would result in a 
superannuated system. Nationalist spokesmen continued to urge technological caution all the 
way to the early 1970s. Yet such warnings could be invoked ad infiniturn; as one proponent 
of TV remarked with wholly apposite cynicism, "we might just as well not have purchased 
any aircraft in South Africa for years because the Concord was shortly to be put into service. 
Or, we should not have abandoned the ox waggon, because who knows what sort of fancy 
electric motor cars are going to be invented sooner or later." [l31 A final variant of the 
reasons for excluding TV came from Hertzog: the same man who contended that TV would 
induce a terrible levelling of cultures and mixing of races, disingenuously claimed that its 
introduction would discriminate against South Afr-ica's bbvarious" black peoples as they 
would lack access to the medium. Such an argument was consistent with the regime's 
strategy of invoking the language of democracy, equal rights, and self-government in order to 
institutionalize the economic and cultural domination of black South Africans by corralling 
them into purportedly "ethnic national homelands". 
Indeed, the Afrikaner nationalist association of TV with foreign domination can only be 
understood in terms of a longer history of inter-colonial rivalry for control over black 
territory, labour power, and economic resources, above all, the mines. [l41 It has to be seen, 
too, in terms of rival white imaginings about how the inception of TV in South Africa would 
change the balance of power - both within the white communities and in relation to the 
internal and international forces ranged against apartheid. 
To engage with the constitutive absence of TV under apartheid is to begin to redress the 
tendency for theories of nationalism and theories of the media to arise in isolation from each 
other. For if two of the most striking intellectual developments of the past decade have been 
the growth of media studies and the resurgent fascination with nationalism, these 
developments have tended to pass each other like ships in the proverbial night. This has 
occurred despite the media's pivotal place in generating, consolidating, and disseminating 
images of national belonging. [l51 The work most responsible for reanimating theoretical 
interest in nationalism, Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities, provides an invaluable 
bridge between these two realms by proposing print capitalism as a primary catalyst for the 
rise of modern nationalism. [l61 Anderson's stress on the links between communications 
technology and the forms of national community notwithstanding, he remains, as Philip 
Schlesinger has observed, oddly indifferent to the impact of post-Gutenberg technologies on 
the invention and circulation of rival visions of national community. [l71 In a rare comment 
on non-print media, Anderson concludes rather briskly that in the late twentieth century 
"advances in communications technology, especially radio and television, give print allies [in 
generating national solidarity] unavailable a century ago". [l81 
The history of apartheid media turns Anderson's comment on its head: prior to the 1970s, 
there is little indication that ruling Nationalists consider TV a potential ally of print and radio 
in the cause of national cohesion. While the dominant tendency to consider TV as subversive 
of print and radio surfaced in extremis under apartheid, it was by no means a South Afiican 
idiosyncracy.' Many other governments of small or medium-sized nations have criticized the 
medium as an agent of international cultural values at the expense of national ones. 
Amidst their general accusations that TV rides roughshod over proud national distinctions, 
Hertzog, Marais, J C Otto, and others hostile to the technology reserved a special concern for 
the impact it might have on press and radio services. Beneath this concern lay the perception 
that TV acted as an agent of linguistic imperialism that would jeopardize other media forms 
upon which the survival of the Afrikaans language depended. Afrikaans newspapers and 
magazines had played a vital role in standardizing the language between 1902 and 1925, 
enabling it to become a respectable and indispensable resource in the anti-imperial labour of 
binding the discordant Afrikaner classes, regions, and political factions. [l91 Television 
threatened to reverse Afrikaans's historically shallow, precarious parity with English. It 
threatened do so, first, by eroding the advertising base on which Afrikaans newspapers 
depended and, second, by extending the authority of English, given that the majority of 
programmes would have to be imported from the USA and Britain. Thus the TV debates 
helped reanimate anti-imperialist anxieties, as Afrikaner nationalists saw the media issue as a 
showdown against that old enemy duo, the English language and foreign-controlled 
monopoly capital. 
If Afrikaner nationalists voiced particular anxiety was over the fate of their press, the 
campaign to obstruct TV was also marked by their relentless advocacy of radio. After 
Hertzog had appointed the ultra-nationalist Meyer chairman of the SABC in 1959, the state- 
controlled radio services came to be seen as central to the wellbeing of the Afrikaans 
language and nation. In the year when he acceded to that office, Meyer declared that "Of all 
communications media ... the warm, human spoken word is and remains (sic) the most 
powerful and influential. Whatever is carried in the other media, and however these media 
do it, the influence and effect depends in the last instance on whether the substance is taken 
up in human conversation, and how it is passed, processed and spread in living 
conversation." [20] When Meyer opined in an SABC annual report a decade later that "radio 
distinguishes itself [from TV] by the fact that it does not enslave and does not want to 
enslave the human spirit" he was not merely implying that TV is addictive. [21] The 
invocation of slavery set up resonant historical echoes: by implication, TV threatened to 
reverse the course of Afrikaner national destiny, returning the volk, its language, and culture 
to the thrall of imperialism. Television was repeatedly projected as an imperial force beyond 
Afrikaner control, while the less costly radio service was advocated for its adaptability to 
local linguistic differences that were invoked as markers of national differences. [22] 
Between 1958 and 1968 Hertzog used his authority as Minister of Posts and Telegraphs to 
become TV's most outspoken and adamantine opponent. Hertzog's opponents dubbed him 
the Mad Hatter, Mother Grundy, Chief of the Luddites, and King Canute, for seeking to fight 
back the tides of technology. [23] However, Meyer, a fellow Broederbonder and an 
idological ally of Hertzog's since the mid-1930s, may ultimately have been the more decisive 
figure in the .entangled histories of Afrikaner nationalism and telephobia. For almost half a 
century - between his role as co-founder of the Afrikaanse Nasionale Studentebond in 1933 
and his retirement as chair of the SABC in 1981 - Meyer exercized influence in an 
astonishing array of Afrikaner cultural institutions. Organizations in which he held office at 
one time or another included the Afrikaanse Nasionale Studentebond, Afrikaner Nasionale 
Kultuurraad, the Economic Institute of the Federasie van Afrikaner Kultuurverenegings, and 
the Nasionale Raad van Trustees. He edited Volkshandel and numerous other publications 
and in 1938 helped found the Ossewa Brandwag. He went on to lead the organization's 
labour front, the Arbeidsfront, and emerged as one of the OB's principal strategists and 
demagogues. In the mid-forties, he campaigned alongside Hertzog in the Mine Workers 
Union in an effort to win over Afrikaans workers to the Christian National Unions. [24] By 
the late 1950s he had become the second most powerful figure in the Broederbond. He went 
on to become the rector of the Rand Afrikaans University and to chair the Dutch Reformed 
Church's Inter-Church Anti-Communist Action Committee. The highwater mark of his 
influence was the period between 1960 and 1972 when he was simultaneously chairman of 
the Broederbond and of the South African Broadcasting Corporation and was responsible for 
the influential propraganda programme, Current Affairs. Between 1969 and 1971 he headed 
the Commission of Inquiry into Matters Relating to Television and in 1976 he oversaw the 
introduction of the medium he had so long opposed. 
Like Hertzog, Verwoerd, and other leading Broederbond opponents of TV, Meyer had 
emerged, in the 1930s, as a leading proponent of a philosophy of nationalism that Dunbar 
Moodie has called neo-Fichteanism. [25] From the perspective of the TV debates, one of the 
most salient articulations of neo-Fichteanism was Dr Nico Diederichs's Nasionalisme as 
Lewensbeskouing en Sy Verhouding tot Internasionalisme (Nationalism as World-View 
and its Relationship to Internationalism) (1935). Diederichs's formulation is particularly 
illuminating because, as his title indicates, it theorises the interface between ethnic nationalist 
and international allegiances which was to become a flashpoint issue during the TV debates. 
Shortly after the publication of Nasionalisme as Lewensbeskouing, Meyer came out publicly 
in defence of Diederichs's ideas, many of which were echoed both in Meyer's early tracts, 
like Die Stryd van die Afrikanerwerker (1941), and in works that appeared during the peak 
years of the TV controversy, like Trek Verder (1959) and The Spiritual Crisk ofthe West 
(1966). [26] 
Diederichs argued that internationalism was inherently decadent and materialistic, for it 
violated the Creator's partition of the species into distinctive nations. Full self-realization 
was a spiritual impulse that could only be achieved through the spiritual form of national 
culture, the divinely ordained marker of difference. "An effort .to obliterate national 
differences thus means more than collision with God's natural law. It also means an effort to 
shirk a divinely established duty or task." [27] Thus, individual freedom could only be 
achieved through the higher freedom of the nation - indeed, the individual was a more 
abstract, insubstantial concept than the nation. [28] 
Neo-Fichtean conceptions of the nation came to be adjusted through their intellectual and 
institutional fusion with Kuyperian Calvinism as well as through the competing needs and 
definitions of the Afrikaner nationalist project. None the less, many transmuted neo-Fichtean 
ideas about national identity were carried forward into. the 1960s by cultural conservatives 
like Meyer and Hertzog. Thus, for instance, their anti-imperialist ardour arose not just out of 
a fear of external domination but from the conviction that the nation - as marked off by 
culture and language - was a sacred unit of difference. In this sense, TV was not just a 
profane technology in the loose sense that it spread swear words, nakedness, and blasphemy, 
but was profane in its enmity toward the nation as an institution sanctified in heaven. TV 
posed a cosmopolitan threat to the fundamental, divine system of differences by fomenting 
intercultural (that is, international) mixing, and by setting the needs, freedoms, and desires of 
the individual above those of the nation. Diederichs had spoken of the creation as God's 
endorsement of "the multiplicity and diversity of nations, languages, and cultures", and as 
evidence of his enmity toward "deadly uniformity". Verkramptes like Meyer, Hertzog, and 
Marais used related arguments in the 1960s, when they opposed not just racial mixing, but 
the dilution of the Afrikaaners' ethnic identity through increasing cultural, political, and 
economic collaboration with English South Africans. Opposition to TV as a channel for 
"deadly uniformity" thus became integral to the broader struggle against ethnic national 
dilution in all its varieties - through liberal individualism, racial mixing, communism, 
monopoly capitalism, commercialism, and the cosmopolitanism of the Jewish and Indian 
diasporas. 
Thus the subject of TV often became the occasion for a detailed cataloguing of the Afrikaans 
nation's enemies. In such listings, the Soviet Union and the West - above all, the USA and 
Britain - were characteristically fused into a composite antagonist. Liberals were merely the 
shock troops of communism and, in combination, the two forces rendered TV an inherently 
pink technology. [30] As Dr J C Otto explained to parliament in 1966, "liberalists, 
communists and leftists all use television to influence people. In many programmes the white 
man is presented as a bad person, as the suppressor and exploiter of the black man. The white 
man is depicted as the person causing misery and frustration for the black man." [31] When, 
in August, 1969 a Washington Post editorial advocated that South Africa adopt TV as a way 
of modernizing its racial attitudes, Jaap Marais responded fiercely in Hoofstad "Do not 
install a TV service. South Africa is not open to Russian or American controlled propaganda. 
That way the people will not be abandoned to the forces of commercialization." [32] 
The reference to commercialization offers a clue to the deeper historical reasons for the 
National Party's twinning of "Russia" and America as enemies. During the decade-and-a-half 
prior to their ascent to power in 1948, Afrikaans nationalists repeatedly articulated the volk's 
destiny in anti-imperial terms that isolated as the leading enemies of Afrikaner unity 
communism and foreign-controlled monopoly capital, the term "foreign" here being 
stretched to include English-speaking South Africans. [33] Both communism and monopoly 
capitalism were condemned for advancing imperialist internationalism: they shared an 
antipathy toward nationalism as the primary, natural, and divinely ordained unit of cultural, 
political, and economic identity. In the case of communism, the international working class 
served as the decisive imagined community - in keeping with M m ' s  conviction that "the 
workers have no fatherland". Concomitantly, under capitalism, imperial corporations 
wrenched people from their national moorings, violating the nation by propagating 
commercial individualism. As Dan O'Meara has cogently argued, during this formative 
phase of Afrikaner nationalism hostility was directed toward international monopoly 
capitalism and seldom towards capitalism per se: indeed, the rise of an ethnic nationalist 
capitalism was central to the consolidation and empowerment of the Afrikaner nation. [34] 
The fear of both communism and monopoly capital suffused Meyer's Ossewa Brandwag 
pamphlets of the early 1940s, where he laboured to dissuade Afrikaner workers from 
identifying with class over volk in the fight against the international capitalists who 
domhated the South Afsican economy. [35] Similar claims braced the case against TV as a 
technology that fomented anti-national identities, be they class or the individual. The old 
spectre of Hoggenheimer was also trundled out as a warning against those who took TV's 
dangers too lightly. Hoggenheirraes, an Afrikaner nationalist caricature of a composite 
Jewish-English capitalist imperialism, was a derogatory corruption of Oppenheimer, the 
name of South Africa's most powerful mine-owning magnates. Thus when Harry 
Oppenheirner sought to advance the cause of TV in 1964, Hertzog swiftly intervened, 
warning, with barely veiled anti-semitism, that "the overseas money power has used 
television as such a deadly weapon to undermine the morale of the white man and even to 
destroy great empires within fifteen years, that Mr Oppenheimer and his friends will do 
anything to use it here". [36] 
Hertzog's assault on Oppenheimer illustrates the slippage between the contention that 
television would subvert the Afrikaner nation and the quite different claim that it would 
destroy white South Africa. Clearly some of the projected threats to Afrikaners could not 
apply to English South Africans: above all, in the arena of language. So the attacks on TV 
cast English South Africans in the contradictory roles of Afrikanerdom's cultural and 
economic enemies whom TV would fortify, and as Afrikanerdom's racial allies whom TV 
would undermine. 
This contradiction dogged the efforts of the anti-TV crusaders to bridge their sense of TV as 
a national threat and a racial one. (Indeed, on occasion, they would portray the technology as 
menacing something called the "white nation".) 1371 To press their case, the nationalists 
charged that W was suffused with "integration propaganda". The principal advocates of 
integration were a collective front comprising communists, the African nations who gained 
independence in growing numbers after 1957, liberals, and the United States. The fact that 
the rise of the civil rights movement in the US coincided with increasing pressure on the 
Nationalists to admit TV only augmented anxieties over TV's "integration propaganda". 
Television could thus be readily portrayed as a symptom of America's lax complicity in the 
decline of the white race and western civilization. [38] 
During the 1960s and early 1970s' this hostility toward America was redoubled by a 
perception of it as going through a particularly degenerate phase. The society that was 
supposedly leading the West seemed to be undergoing every manner of moral relapse: racial 
integration, R & R, feminism, the peace movement, anti-Vietnam War protests, civil rights 
struggle, flower power, drugs, and satanism, all of which TV would pass on to South Africa. 
Thus the National Party continued to outlaw the box in large measure because it was thought 
to transmit such contagion. Television's assailants spoke of the risk of citizens contracting 
the "TV virus"; they feared, too, that it would "contaminate" children. [39] Cumulatively in 
these polemics, the alarm over "foreign transmissions" acquired an over-determined force: it 
became the site where the discourse of media technology dovetailed with the discourse of 
epidemiology. 
In 1965 Meyer, in a flash of hubris, suggested that the USA had become so mired in 
degeneracy that Afrikaner nationalism ought to take over as interim custodian of Western 
values. Persuaded that the Afrikaners exhibited "the strongest Western nationalism, in the 
world today", Meyer reasoned that an Afrikaner-led South Africa could offer the West "the 
lead in the racial struggle of the present and the future. South Africa will make a decisive 
contribution to the consolidation of the entire West as a white world united in its struggle 
against the joint forces of the yellow and black races of the earth. When America reaches this 
level of maturity in the emergent world period, overcoming the transitional sickness and 
taking over the leadership of the whole white world, the West will be very favourably placed 
to win the racial struggle on a global scale." [40] Thus, having rationalized his objection to 
TV on the grounds that it was ineluctably international, Meyer ended up advocating 
international solidarity in a coalition that merged the causes of Afrikaner nationalism, white 
South Africa, and western civilization. What happened to the imperialist domination - 
linguistic, communist, liberal, and monopoly capitalist - that was meant to flow from 
concessions to transnational identities? Meyer's arguments are rife with the contradictions of 
nationalist internationalism, where the more virulently xenophobic a nationalism becomes 
the more it aligns itself imaginatively with an international "race". 
Repeatedly in these debates, appeals to racial solidarity contradict efforts to vindicate the ban 
by distinguishing between the legitimate claims of national sovereignty and the illegitimacy 
of internationalism as an ineluctably imperial and anti-national force. Such contradictions 
became doubly acute once the bantustan policy gained impetus during the 1960s. With the 
advent of the'bantustan system, anti-TV crusaders could fortify their case by making it sound 
less self-interested: TV would not merely threaten Afrikaner national sovereignty but the 
multiple sovereignties of all South Africa's kaleidoscopic ethnic communities. Thus even 
Hertzog, who elsewhere argued that TV led to racial degeneration, came to claim that TV 
would prejudice the interests of blacks, as its prohibitive costs would prevent their diverse 
national cultures from achieving adequate representation. [41] In a similar vein, an official 
advertisement placed in The Times in 1970 declared that "within the borders of South Africa 
there are more different nations, more different races, creeds and colours than in any other 
country. The main task of the South African Broadcasting Corporation is to provide an 
enriching, ennobling service to all, differing[sic] from one another with respect to language 
and cultural identity."[42] Thus the bantustan system allowed Afiikaans verkramptes to 
justify their resistance to TV by parading the kind of sensitivities to difference that would 
scarcely seem incongruous in a contemporary American manifesto of multiculturalism. 
Beaumont Schoeman's article, "TV: a Powerful Medium of Integration", exemplifies this 
sophistical style of reasoning; it also exemplified the ease with which the paternalism of 
bantustan multiculturalism would revert into overt racism. Schoeman maintained that "[TV] 
doesn't respect differences and stresses uniformity. It breaks and loosens up cultures, it 
sweeps aside borders and eats away at the values of communities. The propagandists call it a 
powerful agent of democratization which is a sweet-sounding equivalent of calling it an 
agent of homogenization ... There is no more powerful medium for dismantling the 
population groups' sense of identity. Nor is there a more effective instrument for the 
furtherance of integration." 1431 "Integration" becomes the swivel term, rotating 
Schoeman's argument away from a defence of multiple, parallel community identities and 
toward a crude, binary, hierarchical vision of racial degeneracy. Once TV has created 
homogeneous humanoids and with them a lowest common denominator culture, Schoeman 
continues, the medium will inevitably "drag the spiritual standards of the whites down to the 
level of the non-whites". 
Commentators on the ban have sometimes expressed bafflement at the National Party's 
reluctance to harness TV's propaganda potential. In the words of one such commentator, 
"tyrants do not fear television; they use it". 1441 However, South Africa from the late fifties 
to the early seventies was no orthodox tyranny. The Nationalists recognized that TV's 
centralized, internationalist tendencies ran counter to their programme of political 
domination bent on proliferating, not containing, ethnic nationalist differences. 
After the giddy success of his Understanding Media in 1964, Marshall McLuhan came to 
dominate popular perceptions of TV well into the seventies, a development that only 
entrenched National Party fears that the medium would subvert state efforts to dominate 
black South Africans by dispersing them among a set of atomized ethnic "homelands". For a 
regime determined to devise or reinvent bbpure" Xhosa villages in Transkei, Zulu villages in 
kwaZulu, and so forth, across ten ethnically "authentic" bantustans, McLuhan's image of TV 
as productive of a "global village" represented not technological utopianism but a grim 
nightmare. 
However, the prevailing Nationalist view on the incompatibility of TV and "multi-national 
development" did not go unopposed. A strong pro-TV lobby emerged among white English- 
speaking South Africans, whose case was advanced by the United Party and the white 
English-language press. By 1966, TV had become such a decisive issue for the United Party 
that it ran a national parliamentary campaign on the slogan: "Want TV? Vote UP." National 
Party supporters responded by doctoring the opposition's electoral posters. The resulting 
"Want TB? Vote UP" was certainly more consistent with the regime's perception of TV as a 
viral technology. [45] 
The ongoing TV fracas became a forum for an intense contest over the criteria of civilization 
and modernity. For the Nationalist spokesmen and Afrikaans press, civilization's continuance 
required TV's exclusion; for the United Party and English press the resistance to TV was a 
resistance to civilization itself. Would TV induce degeneration or was its absence a mark of 
backwardness? This conflict stemmed in part from divergent conceptions of national identity. 
Unlike Afrikaners, English-speaking whites never generated a strong ethnic nationalism and, 
for reasons of language, culture, and class, their sense of projected community tended to be 
more inclusive of international, particularly British and American, elements. Moreover, given 
the disparity between their economic preeminence and their weakness in the corridors of 
formal political power, English-speaking South Africans were inclined to favour TV as a 
potential capitalist and cultural ally. 
If the National Party's claim that it was protecting putatively discrete black cultural identities 
from the cosmopolitan solvent of TV was manipulative and self-serving, so, too, was the 
United Party's obsessive linkage between TV and civilization. The UP and English press 
repeatedly portrayed the absence of TV as a threat to South Africa's claim to be a civilized 
nation, as if the medium were a kind of a membership badge guaranteeing passage into the 
inner circle of the truly advanced. [46] 
The implications of this position are exposed most clearly by Senator Crook's insistence that 
"it is in the country's interest and that of the people of South Africa that we should have this 
most modem and powerful of all communications. It is in the interest of South Africa and in 
the interest of the prestige and good name of South Africa that we should not be bracketed 
with the most backward peoples of the world such as the Eskimos who have not got 
television." [47] The sudden guest appearance of the Eskimos exemplifies the tendency 
within the UP and the English press to invoke criteria for civilization, modernity, and 
progress that are not merely technological but ethnic. The Eskimos, like the "Bushmen", the 
Pygmies, and the Zulu, have long served as shorthand for "civilization's" racial- 
technological antithesis. What emerges, then, is a proclivity among English-speaking South 
Africans in the late 1950s and the 1960s to fixate on TV as a surrogate barometer of South 
Africa's civilization and advancement, displacing more basic criteria like universal suffrage 
and racial equity. 
The United Party was a fundamentally conservative organization: during the height of the TV 
debates, it was to be found supporting the banning of the ANC and the PAC, the introduction 
of detention without trial, and opposing "one person one vote". Television offered the UP 
and its allies the chance to shift the criteria for civilization from the awkward, disturbing 
realm of racial policy to what, from an English perspective, was the far less threatening realm 
of technology. One can see this at work in a 1969 editorial from the Rand Daily Mail: "This 
deprivation has been deliberately imposed on the people of this country ... The extent of the 
stultification to which South Africans have thus been subjected is practically incalculable." 
[48] Deprivation and stultification here refer not to the consequences of apartheid but to the 
consequences of no TV. 
Who precisely was being deprived? Even judging South Africa's advancement by 
technological standards alone, the society was crippled by a desperately uneven access to 
older, more basic criteria of modernity - like electricity, for one. In the mid-sixties, fewer 
than ten per cent of black homes were electrified. Thus the call to remedy South Africa's 
backwardness by introducing TV would mean widening the technological gulf, exchanging 
black candlelight and white electricity for black candlelight and white TV. For this reason, 
although the ANC and the PAC were committed to introducing TV the medium, they could 
scarcely foreground it as a policy priority. Nor did they assume any vocal role in the 
controversy. The issue concerned, overwhelmingly, rival efforts within the white ruling 
classes to define their parameters of allegiance and interest in ethnic, racial, national, and 
international terms. 
The apogee of the TV debates been 1958 and 1971 coincided with the rise of independent 
states in Africa, a process that formed a significant backdrop to both the Nationalists' and the 
United Patty's attitudes toward the media. The Nationalists were alarmed that African 
decolonization might allow Radio Moscow and Radio Peking increased penetration of South 
African airwaves and that countries like Ghana, Zaire, Nigeria, and Zambia might beam in 
anti-apartheid propaganda. [49] Furthermore, given the increased radicalism of the liberation 
movement in the post-Sharpeville era, Verwoerd's regime in particular feared any further 
opening of the channels of communications to international influence. 
Thus, despite its standing as Africa's industrial leviathan, South Africa was only the 23rd 
African country to accept TV - in the wake of such economic minnows as Uganda, Zambia, 
and Ethiopia. [SO] The United Party's principal response to this disparity was to cry shame 
that South Africa should be "left behind by countries like Rhodesia, India, Nigeria, even 
Ghana". [51] Cumulatively, in the context of African and, beyond that, Third-World 
decolonization, the United Party's insistence on the "shame" of South Africa's inability to 
flaunt such an icon of technological progress took on a rather explicit racial dimension. 
In 1969, the National Party appointed a Commission of Inquiry into Matters Relating to 
Television. Nine of the twelve commissioners were Broederbonders, with Meyer in the 
chair. The report contrasted the organization of TV in fifteen countries, the United States, 
Britain, Italy, Japan, and Germany among them, and, after nearly two years of deliberation, 
issued a recommendation that TV be admitted into South Africa. There was to be, however, a 
five year gap between this recommendation and the big switch-on in 1976. 
What pressures prompted the National Party to appoint the commission in the first place? 
What circumstances produced such a volte-face on the part of a regime whose hostility to the 
box had, prior to 1968, shown no sign of softening? One immediate answer was Prime 
Minister Vorster's sacking of Hertzog from his cabinet that year. Hertzog had come to 
personify the' ultra-nationalist, technophobic, xenophobic, anglophobic, and racist face of the 
anti-TV coalition. Prior to Verwoerd's assassination in 1966, Verwoerd as Prime Minister, 
Hertzog as Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, and Meyer as chair of the SABC had formed a 
powerful triumvirate of resistance to TV. 
Yet Hertzog's fall from power was less the root cause of a greater openness toward TV than 
an epiphenomenon, a symptom of deeper shifts in Afrikaner attitudes to the idea of 
international community which TV symbolized. Over the course of the 1960s, a breach had 
developed within Afrikanerdom between the verligtes who argued for expansionism and the 
verkramptes, led by Hertzog, who advocated the kind of isolationism that had shored up 
Afi-ikaner power since the late 1930s. Ironically, this rift within the ranks was a measure of 
Afrikaner nationalism's success in consolidating political power and extending its economic 
power by favouring Afrikaner businesses, providing sheltered employment for unskilled 
Afi-ikaner labour in the labyrinthine apartheid bureaucracy, and holding down black wages 
by mounting unprecedently violent, multifaceted assaults on the resistance movements in the 
decade following the 1960 S harpeville massacre. By 1964 such repression had temporarily 
but effectively routed mass opposition and with it enhanced South Africa's reputation among 
international corporations as an attractive, stable area of investment. During the 1960s, South 
Africa's growth rate was surpassed only by that of Japan. 
In real terms black wages fell over the decade, while white wealth grew incrementally. The 
emergence of a powerful Afrikaner capitalist stratum altered the class composition of the 
volk, provoking clashes of interest within the alliance that had bound Afrikaner nationalism 
since the late 1940s. The petty bourgeois, Transvaal-based forces associated with Verwoerd, 
Meyer and Hertzog began to lose ground to the more flexible capitalists who backed Vorster. 
Compared to the laager politicians, the petty bourgeoisie, and small farmers, this newly 
confident entrepeneurial class of Afrikaner tended toward a less involuted, defensive vision 
of the national interest. They were profiting from and advocating expanded links with non- 
Afi-ikaner capital, be it English-South African or foreign. Concomitantly, such Afrikaners 
were apt to see economic growth as the best guarantee of continued white domination and to 
consider TV as a potential asset for commerce. Thus this increasingly muscular class of 
urbanized, cosmopolitan, corporate Afrikaners was less susceptible to the standard 
admonitions that TV would provoke internationalization, commercialization, imperialism, 
anglicization, and secular deviations from the volk's destiny of divine election. This 
rapprochement between Afrikaner and English capital interests was clearly signalled by the 
fact that in 1969 the Annual Congresses of the Afrikaanse Handels Instituut and the 
Association of Chambers of Commerce both called upon the government to commit itself to 
TV. [52] In that same year, the verkramptes - who included TV's most adamantine 
opponents like Hertzog and Marais - broke with the Nationalists to form the far-right 
Herstigte Nationale Party which, however, was quickly reduced to a marginal force in white 
politics. Ultimately, the tensions between white economic success and mounting world 
pressures to isolate apartheid encouraged the Vorster regime to engage in more assiduous 
efforts at outreach. 
On top of these changes, two extraterrestrial happenings - the Apollo 11 mission and 
innovations in satellite technology - suddenly augmented the prospects of South African TV. 
On 21 July 1969, Neil Armstrong strolled across the face of the moon. The event became - 
like TV itself - a powerful constitutive absence in South African society. Amidst a booming 
economy in which Afrikaner capitalists had become increasingly enamoured of the 
"American way", the moon landing further tilted the balance of power away from the 
rejection of the USA as a culturally degenerate imperialism and toward a rival view of it as a 
technologically advanced world leader. In 1968, just a year before the moon landing, the 
American student revolts had fuelled the cause of laager nationalists who sought to prevent 
TV from imposing American decadence on South Africa. Armstrong, Edwin Aldrin and 
Michael Collins unwittingly helped turn that view around. There was, of course, an explicitly 
Cold War context for the landing: astronauts 1, cosmonauts zero, a rematch after America's 
earlier defeat. But the South African media presented Apollo 11 principally as a great 
triumph for humankind, as if on the moon the astronauts had found a third, extraterrestrial 
space for pure human discovery, untrammelled by the fraught dialectics between 
internationalism and nationalism. Whether the landing was interpreted as a defeat for 
communism or an apolitical triumph for the species, the media angles on the event made it 
unassimilable to the dominant verkrampte view of the USA as an anti-national, imperialist 
force. 
Armstrong's words - "One small step for man, one giant leap for mankind" - combined two 
very powerful appeals: to the ideology of the family of "man", and to the ideology of the 
march of progress. Both applied salt to white wounds, quickening the pain of spacial 
ostracism from the "family" of nations and of temporal abandonment - of being "behind the 
times". 
More dramatically than any prior event, the moon landing impressed upon people TV's 
power to produce the sensation of simultaneous, "global" community. It allowed each 
watching living room family the illusion of participating in the unity in variety of the species. 
Around the world, 800 million people were riveted by their TVs while South Africans were 
reduced to twiddling the dials on the radio. For many whites - already rendered paranoid by 
the force of their exile from world affairs - their inability to partake of such a singular 
moment of "global" community came to seem like an exasperating, self-inflicted 
disinvitation. A Rand Daily Mail editorial captured this sense of let-down perfectly with the 
snappy title "Out of this World". [S31 l l 
A journalist had once complained that Hertzog and the twentieth century seemed not to be on 
speaking terms. 1541 The Apollo 11 mission generalized that sense of incommunicado: white 
South Africans had become non-participants in the twentieth century. Such anxieties were 
exacerbated by most whites' investment in believing that they belonged on the classy side of 
their obsessive divides between progress and backwardness, the modem and the "'tribal", the 
civilized and the uncivilized. As the drawn-out wranglings over TV illustrated, the traffic 
between scientific and racial calibrations of modernity had been freely licensed under 
apartheid. The exclusion of white South Africans from an event that the media billed as a 
scientific rite of passage into an unbounded future thus threatened both their technological 
self-assurance and their sense of racial superiority. 
Shortly after the moon landing, the Johannesburg Planetarium offered public screenings of 
the spectacle. The TV footage drew mile-long queues and the crowds - separate days for 
blacks and whites - were so vast that the police were called in to disperse them. But not 
before 100,000 people had witnessed the landing and - to judge from newspaper interviews - 
had come away feeling, for the most part, not merely unsullied by their contact with 
Hertzog's demonic box but defrauded by their exclusion from the live event. [55] Pro-TV 
letters and editorials clogged the newspapers, the Television Society drew up a petition, a 
successful chain letter appeal was launched, and the United Party called for a "national" (i.e. 
white) referendum on the issue, claiming that the majority - by which, again, they meant 
merely a majority of the white minority - now favoured TV. Even Dirk Richard, a prominent 
hardline editor of an Afrikaans newspaper, announced his conversion to TV. [56] 
After the earlier Apollo 10 mission in 1968, the SABC had embarked on a rearguard effort at 
damage control. Its annual report, marvelled at how the corporation had transported the 
Apollo mission into "the homes and meeting places of all people possessing radios, not only 
in South Africa but also in the rest of Africa, Europe, the East and even the United States. 
Sharing this experience in such an intimate, and communal manner would not have been 
possible through any other medium." [57] The report proceeded to extol the "wonder of 
radio": "With the advent of television, which is essentially a radio technique (although used 
mainly as a film medium in the intial stages) it seemed as if sound radio would be forced into 
an obscure background position in mass communications. This tendency did not last long. In 
recent times, sound radio has been moving into first position ... Radio distinguishes itself by 
the fact that it does not enslave or want to enslave the human spirit." 1581 
After the much more spectacular Apollo 11 venture the following year, the SABC was at 
least in a position to announce, alongside its account of the landing, the appointment of a 
Commission of Inquiry into the "desirability or otherwise" of admitting a TV service. [59] 
However, the corporation persisted with the excesses of the annual eulogy to radio - by now 
a set-piece of the report. But it all sounded like a hymn sung in the dark. While praising the 
technological power of radio to bond the human race in an act of instant communion, the 
report maintained a studied silence over the fact that anyone anywhere had actually observed 
the landing. Instead, it flattered radio's sensory repertoire, bestowing on it a visual capacity 
that rendered, by implication, TV superfluous. "Radio brings events closer to the public and 
offers a glimpse of the drama of life. No other medium achieves this so effectively; and if 
there is a challenge in the Seventies, it is that radio must employ technical aids and so co- 
ordinate its internal organisation that it gives its audience a view - an intimate view - of the 
world around us ... It is hoped that in building upon these foundations in the decade ahead, 
radio will further distinguish itself as the foremost medium for permitting an audience to 
observe history in the making." (my emphases) [60] 
1969 saw a second extraterrestrial development strengthen the case for TV. The increasing 
sophistication of satellite technology ensured that as of September that year any South 
African family who could afford both a TV set and a R150 rooftop aluminium bowl could 
have international TV beamed in, circumventing the absence of a national service. [61] In 
verkrampte circles, this fresh threat set familiar alarm bells ringing. Jaap Marais warned that 
satellite broadcasts "will be a mighty force in the hands of the Russians and Americans ... 
[Tlhey will try to give greater actuality and striking power to the propaganda issuing from 
the platform of the U.N." [62] Marais proceeded to paint a nightmare tableau: "To form a 
rough image of what could happen, one must picture the events of Sharpeville and the whole 
international propaganda hell that came together so neatly around it, projected against South 
Africa in circumstances wherein the population is equipped with television receivers through 
which American or Russian controlled satellites can broadcast." [63] In an account that 
resurrected the old dread of a Trojan Horse in the living room, Marais issued a call for arms 
in this war of stealth which he considered to be doubly subversive because it went undeclared 
and was waged with unconventional weapons in the war zone of psychology. "There is no 
more powerful instrument of persuasion", he continued, "than TV, and a nation who can be 
reached by its enemies through TV finds itself on the most dangerous battlefield imaginable, 
because it is forced on to the defensive and is up against an invisible enemy whom it cannot 
attack unless it can also direct satellite broadcasts against the enemy powers." 
In a companion piece, Marais argued that South Africa was psychologically just as ill- 
prepared for the introduction of TV as it was technologically incapable of launching a voyage 
to the moon. [64] He insisted, therefore, that to launch a nationally controlled TV service as 
a defence against propaganda issuing from foreign satellites would be to play into the hands 
of the "Russians" and Americans. However, when Marais published these opinions in 
September 1969, he, along with Hertzog, had recently been evicted from the Nationalist 
Party as part of Vorster's purge of verkrumptes. The baton of intransigence towards TV had 
passed from the National Party to the Herstigtes. Just as Hertzog, in 1969, continued to warn 
that the introduction of TV would spell the end of the white race, so too, Marais's stance on 
the satellite issue was out of kilter with the reformed thinking on the issue within a realigned 
National Party. [65] 
Nationalist cabinet ministers were just as panic stricken as Marais by the prospect of satellite 
broadcasts, but they recommended a contrary solution: national TV should be the first line of 
defence. So in an ironic volte-face, Nationalist leaders could now argue that the introduction 
of state-controlled TV was necessary for the preservation of "the South African way of life". 
[66] Thus TV came to be reconceived as an anti-imperial device and an integral part of the 
nation's defence network. In the impassioned words of one convert, anyone who tried to 
withhold TV from South Africa would "be the biggest saboteur of the national defence the 
country has known". C671 
So advances in satellite technology helped reduce the contradictions between the pro-TV and 
anti-TV lobbies, between those who sought wider community and those who wished to 
confine community to narrow Afrikaner nationalist or white terms. The regime could 
introduce the technology as a strategy for expanding international economic and cultural 
contacts, but it was also in a position to rationalize such action as a protectionist measure 
against foreign invaders. 
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